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Justification by Works:

Fate and the Gospel in the Roman Empire
ROBBB.T L WILltBN

prominent theme in the Christian
writings of the second and third
cenruries is that men are "rewarded and
punished according to the quality of their
works." It is sounded in the middle of the
second cenrury by Justin Martyr in his
First Apology: "We have learned from the
prophets and declare as the uuth, that
penalties and punishments and good re"·ards are given according to the quality
of each man's action." 1 A cenrury later,
Odgen, in Contra Celsum, lists this belief
as an article of faith alongside the resurrection and virgin birth. "Almost the whole
world has come to know the preaching (to
kerygma) of Christians better than the
opinions of philosophers," writes Origen.
For has not everyone heard of the Christian teaching about "Jesus' birth from
a virgin, and of his crucifixion, and his
resurrection and the proclamation of the
judgment which punishes sinners according to their deserts and pronounces the
righteous worthy of reward?" 2

A

Wuerthwein
Justin Martyr, .A.t,ologid 43.
2 Origen, Comr11 C•ls•m 1.7 (Text by P.
Koetschau in Dit, Griacbiscbn Cbrisll;eb•n
Scbri/lll•llff tiff ffsln tlrn J11brb11,uJnu
[Leipzig: J. C. Heinrichs, 1931] i Eng. tranS.,
Henry Chadwick, Orign: Comr11 C•ls•m
[Cambridge: Universir, P.r:ess.
also 1965]).
1

Con. C•ls. 1.9, 291 38i 3.16, 76i 4.3, 10;
5.16, 83i 6,55i 8.48, 5 li et passim.

Robttrl L. Wilin is assishml t,rof•sso, of
"'61-rislie lh•olog, Ill PortllMm Uni1111rm,,
Nt1111 Yo,.i.

To ears attuned to the Reformation the
statements of Justin and Origen sound
like a not too subtle support of justification by works. Where we would expect
Christian thinkers to accent the gracious
action of God, we find that they assert that
man is capable, according to his works, to
appear righteous before God. "The
apostles taught," says Origen, "that the
~ul . . . will be rewarded according to its
deserts after its deparrure from this world;
for it will either obtain an inheritance of
eternal life and blessedness, if its deeds
shall warrant this, or it must be given over
to eternal fire." 3
3 Origen, D• Prin,;piis 1. pref. 5i also
3.1.li see also Con. C•ls. 8.51: ''The whole

foundation of [Christian] faith is God and the
promises concerning the rigb~us given by
Christ and the teaching about the punishment
of the wicked." (Chadwick, p. 489)
For rewards and punishment in the New
Testament see Matt. 25 :31-46 and 2 Cor. 5: 10,
to mention only twO instances. The problem
has engendered a large and often quite tendentious literature, especially
Herbert Preisker,
among Procescana.
See Emst
and
mislhos, in Th•ologiul Diclio•'"1 of lh• Nftll
T•slllm•nl, IV (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), 69-72i G. Bornkamm "Der Lohngcdanke im Neuen Testament,': B11.,,g•lhch• Th.alop VI, ( 1946),
143-66i Floyd V. Filion,
See SI. Plllll's Cnut,liot,
of R•comt,ns• (l,ejpzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 193~)i
Bo Reicke 'The New Testament Concepuon
of Reward•., Jf,uc Sowc.s
It, Trtlllilin Clwl-

u

1;.11,,•: Mlln1•s o6ms ~ M. ~ GopM

(Neuchicel: Delachaux and Niesdf, 1950),
195-206; Willem Cornelis ftll
''Tbe
Teaching of Good Worb in I 'Pefs, Nn,

Unnik,

11
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The primitive Christian belief in grace
seems to have given way to a doarine of
works based on the freedom of man's will
to choose good and evil. Describing this
transformation in early Christian thought
one historian wrote: "There is no need to
dwell upon the disastrous results of such
tendencies and ideas. . . . In it a defective
theology and a defective experience of
God combine with an unintelligent misapprehension of the essence of morality
and a stereotyped ethical code to undo the
entire work of revelation. . . . The vision
of God is fading; and as it fades the charaaeristic dangers of Judaism come back,
only thinly disguised by a veneer of Christian phrases." 4
In this article we examine the early
Christian belief in "rewards and punishments" and ask why, in the situation of the
second and third centuries, Christians were
led to assert something that sounds very
much like "justification by works." How
do the words of Justin and Origen look
when viewed from the perspective of the
Greco-Roman world of the second century? What is the setting for belief in
"rewards and punishments" and what role
does this belief play in Christian thinking
during the period?
I
In antiquity appeal to "rewards and
punishments" or "praise and blame" usually appeared in connection with an arguT•s"'1nnl S1wlit,s ( 1954-55), pp. 92-110.

Por rewards in the teaching of Jesus, see John
Jleumann, 1•1111 in lh• Ch11reh's Gospels (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), pp. 241-50

wilh .recent bibliography.
•
4
Kennelh B. Kirk, Th• Vision of Go,l,
(London: lnnsmaas, Green and Co., 1931)
PP. 13~9; 111.
'

ment for moral responsibility.6 The distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions - central to Aristotle's view
of ethics - is based on the view that man
is under certain conditions not responsible
for his actions while under other conditions
he is responsible. "Virtue is concerned
with feelings and actions," writes Aristotle.
"But it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given."
Therefore we muse distinguish what is
voluntary from what is done by coercion,
for only then can we "assign rewards and
punishments." Aristotle wished co show
that when man acts out of neither ignorance nor compulsion he is the "author
of his own actions," and for this reason
we designate such actions "dependent on
ourselves and voluntary." This conclusion
is supported, says Aristotle, by the practice of lawgivers who "punish and exact
redress from those who do evil ( except
when it is done under compulsion, or
through ignorance for which the agent
himself is not responsible) , and honor
those who do noble deeds, in order to encourage the one sore and to repress the
ocher; but nobody tries to encourage us
to do things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary." 8
Aristotle is addressing himself to the
problem of moral behavior, and he tries
6 There is no survey of the idea of rewards
and punishments in antiquity nor in early
Christianity. However, the literature on fate,
astrology, free will, and so forth discusses the
problem. See especially David Amand, P11111Usm• el Ubn,,l'An1iq11u,
uns
Greequ•
(Louvain: Universite de Louvain, 1945), and the
literature cited in note 7.
8 See Niehof'llllehe1111 B1hies 3. 1-5. On
Aristotle see the superb commentar}' by Harold
Henry Joachim, ed. D. A. Rees, Th• NiehomMh•1111 Blhies (Toronto: Oxford Piess, 1951).

(60)

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/37

2

Wilken: Justification by Works: Fate and the Gospel in the Roman Empire

JUSTIFICATION BY WORKS

381

to show the integral part that responsibility plays in a proper understanding of
morality. What he says here helps to lay
the groundwork for a later discussion in
Hellenistic times, namely, human responsibility and freedom in contrast to fatalism
and determinism. The argument for freedom based on moral responsibility was developed and expounded by the academic
philosopher Carneades in the second century B. C. But Carneades had a somewhat
different goal in mind since he was contending against belief in fate and the growing interest in astrology.7 By his time the
intellectual and social situation had
changed considerably from the days of
Aristotle. Zeno had founded the new philosophical school of the Stoics, and this
school had come to great prominence and
influence by the second century B. C.
Furthermore, astrological thinking had begun to assume a greater role in the Hellenistic world, and it joined with Stoicism
to present a united front on the question
of fate and necessity.

Carneades left no writings, but through
the citation of his arguments by later
writers, and as a result of the careful researches of Dom David Amand, we can
reconstruct the basic outline of his arguments against fatalism.8 Carneades had a
cumber of fixed targets in mind - the
Stoic Chryssipus for example - and his
challenge to fatalistic thinking takes two
forms. He offers a series of arguments
against astrology, attempting to show how
fragile the rationale and empirical base of
astrology actually is. We have, he says, no
truly scientific means to calculate the movement of the stars and the moment of a
person's birth. This lack of precision renders it impossible to prepare an accurate
horoscope. He argues further that men
born under the same sign of the Zodiac
frequently have different fortunes in life,
and that men born under different signs,
for example, all the people of a given land
or nation, frequently have similar customs,
institutions, temperament, character, and
so forth. Presumably this is determined by
their own history and uaditions, rather
7 On fare and astrology sec Amand and
Begrifft1
•nd. Heim11,mn•
Wilhelm Gundel, Beitrigt1 %Mr l!ntwick•l•ngsthan by the stars.
g•sehieht• d•r
A.11,mk•
These arguments are widely repeated by
(Giessen, 1914), and his article "Heimarmene"
in P11ub,s R•llkne1elopiidit1 d•r Cl4ssisehen A.l- Christians and non-Christians alike in the
lrrt•mswissnseh11/I, VII (Srungart: J. B. Metzler, 1912), 2622---45; Max Pohlenz, Dia Sto,,, centuries after Carneades. However, it is
I (Gottingen: Vandenhocck & Ruprecht, 1948 Carneadcs' second series of arguments
to 49), 110 ff.; also Pohlenz, Pr••dom in
which concern us here. Carneadcs also opGre•k Li/• 11nd. ThoNghl (Dordrecht, Holland:
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1966); W. 0. posed fatalism on the basis of a moral

.

Schroeder "Farum" in R••ll•xikon /iir
. A.ntik• argument derived from the concept of re•nd. Chrislnl•m, VII (Smngart: H1ersemann,
wards and punishments and an appeal to
1950), 523-636; Frederick H. Cramer, A.sPolitics Lllw
lrology in Rom1111
11ntl
(Philadel- human responsibility. He maintained that
phia: American Philosophical Sociery, 1954) i
the acceptance of astrological fatalism
Pram Cumont, A.s1,olog1 11ntl R•liiion tffllong
RomtmSlh• Gr••ks IIIUl
(New York: Dover
s On Carneadcs. see Amand, pp. 41-70;
Publications, 1960), unabridsed republication
-86. The chief value of Amand's smdy is
571 he reconstrUCCS. on the basis of the later
of 1912 translation; William Chase Greene, that
Moir•, PIM, Good. .,,,l l!"_il i~ GH•J, Tho411g4h)I uadi.
Carneades' arpmeDts apinst facalism.
(Cambridse: Harvard U01ver11ry Press, 19
.
uon,
(61)

Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1969

3

Concordia Theological Monthly, Vol. 40 [1969], Art. 37

JUSTIFICATION BY WORKS

382

simply rendered moral action meaningless. H men's aaions are determined by
fate or the stars, virtue makes no sense
and there can be no "praise or blame" or
"rewards and punishments." Legislation
against aiminals would be useless and
absurd, for there would be no basis for distinguishing right and wrong action.
Furthermore, what would be the purpose
of persuasion, encouragement, and so forth,
for these, too, presuppose a freedom of
choice and the capability of doing something willingly. Finally, astrological fatalism destroys piety and religion, for there
is no purpose in prayer or sacrifice. What
will be is determined by immutable fate
and cannot be changed.
The attack on asuological fatalism continued unabated during the first centuries
of the Christian era. Members of differing
philosophical schools entered the fray,
offering arguments which sprang out of
their particular philosophical beliefs. The
Platonists insisted on the existence of divine powers which influence man, but denied the existence of fate. The Peripatetics
stres.,ed the lack of an empirical grounding
for the claims of asuologers. Sceptics,
Cynics, and others denied there was any
possibility of genuine knowledge, much
less knowledge of the movement of the
stars and planets. Religious and ethical
thinkers pressed the moral argument
against the view that man's actions were
determined by someone other than himself. In this category fall a number of
• •

1.

wr1angs, xor example, that of a "student"
of Plutarch who wrote D• Pt110; Muimus
of Tyre's "H divination exists, what is left
p
ill
d
to1 rec W" ?" an the important work of
.& - - . l f A hrod" • also _ 11_.J
.rumuuc,; o
pmas,
uwrn D•

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/37

Fato,0 written toward the beginning of the
third century.
The parallels between Alexander and
Christian writers are close. Origen, for example, repeats many of the uaditional
arguments which Alexander had used and
sometimes relies on the same illustrations
from Greek antiquity. To Alexander, an
Aristotelian, denial of free will and belief
in fate not only undercuts moral responsibility and makes moral action meaningless;
it also makes belief in providence impossible, casts piety to the wind, and "upsets
the whole life of man." If everything is
determined before it happens, asks Alexander, how can one speak of "praise and
blame"? "If things take place . . . in such
a manner, how can some of us still be
praised and others be under censure with
any just reason? We see in fact that nobody attributes the cause of good and
noble actions to destiny or necessity." The
idea of providence requires belief in rewards and punishments for providence concerns itself with "merited reward" rather
than with reward according to some previously established necessity. Thus we can
take comfort from the life of a virtuous
man, for this shows that men are not
bound to be what they were at birth and
that the "possession of virtue lies in our
own power." ( epb he.min) 10
o Pseudo-Plutarch, D• PIiio, in Frank Cole
Babbit, Pl111•rch's Mor•li•, Loeb Classical Library, VII (Cambridge: Harvard UniversitJ
Press, 1959); Maximus of Tyre, ed. H. Holbein,

Mtaimi T,n Philosopho•met111
(Leipzig,
1910); .Alexander of Aphrodisias, 011 PIii•, ed.

Augustine Fitzgerald (London: B. G. Teubner,
1931). On the many works wriaen apimt
facalism during the second century,
Cramer,
see
pp. 195-208; Amand, pp. 101-56.
n
l6 (P"
p,n 80 to
10 Alexander, O" c-'11111,
1tz., r■
84); 18 (Pitz., p. 84); 27 (Pitz., p. 116) •
(62)
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In Christian authors the phrase "rewards and punishments" and related terms
occur in much the same setting that they
do in non-Christian writings of the period.
That is, reference to rewards and punishments is part of the discussion of morality
and human responsibility and the related
problems of freedom of the will and providence. The Christian writers, however, face
a somewhat unique problem, because they
find themselves charged with fatalism and
they appeal to "rewards and punishments"
as proof that they do not think man is
determined by forces over which he has
no control. The Christian belief in a God
who elects man for salvation led some to
think that Christians believed in a doctrine
similar to fatalism.11 Further, some saw
the Christian belief in prophecy as another
indication of predestination. The prophecies suggest that "events were foreknown
and predicted and took place according to
inevitable destiny," says Justin. But this is
not our understanding, he continues,
for we have learned "from the prophets"
that "penalties and punishments and good
rewards are given according to the quality
of each man's aaion. If this were not so,
but all things happened in accordance
with destiny, nothing at all would be left
to us (lo eph hemin). For if it is destined
that one man should be good and another
wicked, then neither is the one acceptable
and the other blameworthy. And if the
human race does not have the power by
free choice to avoid what is shameful and

383

to choose what is right, then there is no
responsibility for actions of any kind.12
Justin's argument is of course highly
traditional. What is not uaditional, however, is the new use made of the argument,
the definition of the Christian belief in
prophecy, and the claim that he learned
about "rewards and punishments" from the
prophets. He cites two texts, Deur. 30: 15,
"I have set before you good and evil, choose
the good," and Is. 1: 19, "If you are willing and listen to Me, you will eat the good
of the land." 13 Justin's rendering of these
texts is somewhat free but his point is
clear. Both Deuteronomy and Isaiah say
that man "chooses" good and evil and is
not determined or predestined to be good
or evil Therefore man acts on the basis
of free will, not by the power of fate.
Justin's posture is basically defensive. He
does not reBect on the implications of enlisting belief in rewards and punishments
in support of the Christian cause, nor does
he sense, much less investigate, the consequences of claiming that free will and rewards and punishments is a teaching derived from the prophets.
After Justin, Christian apologists regularly appealed to rewards and punishments and free will against determinism
and astrology. Thus, in his OraJio ml Gruco.r, Tatian polemicizes at length against
astrology and he relies on belief in free
12 Justin, A.pol. 43 (Trans. E. R.. Hardy, p.
269).
1a These texts and others become part of the

standard reperroire of Christian defenders of
Oetnuu 11.6. "For whateVer we do, what free will See, for example, Origeo, D• Pnnei,.
some attribute to Pate, you attribute to God; piis 3.1.6. On the subject of the use of Scripthus your sea believes that men will, not of ture in connection with astrology and free will
themselves but as they were elected to will see Uno lliedioger, Di6 Hrili1• Sel,n/1 ••
tin 1mehisel,n Kirel,• 1•1n tl;.
Therefore you create an unjust Judge K""'iJ/
who
punishes men on the basis of lot and not of Jf.s1ralo,;. (Innsbruck: Unive.rsititsverlq Wagner, 19,6), pp.173-74.
will." (Kyaler, p. 78)
(63)
11
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will as support for his argument.14 Clem-

ent of Alexandria also draws on the same
series of arguments, not so much against
fatalistic astrology, but against the Stoics.
If the soul does not have the "power of inclination and disinclination" (he exo11sia
tes h0f'1Tlds kai aphormes) and evil is involuntary, we can hardly speak of "praise
or censures, nor of rewards and punishments." 115 However, it is not until Origen
that the question receives extended treatment and the problems and possibilities of
relying on these arguments becomes apparent.
H Tatian, Ort1lio t1d. Grt1ecos 7.4-11.1; see
also Justin, Ditll. 102.4; 88.5; Athenagoras,
Hmbt11s1 24.4; Theophilus of Antioch, To A11toZ,c11s 2.27; Clementine Recognitions 4.23;
and the interesting work by Bardesanes, Book
of the Llws of the Co11ntries (Le Liv,e des lois
des fM,s, ed. Francois Nau [Paris, 1899] 1 English
t.mnslation: The Book of the Laws of Co11ntries,
ed. William Cureton, [London: R.evingsron,
1855]). For other Christian authors see Retlllexikon f•r Anlike tmd. Ch,istenlNm, VII, 586 lf.
1IS Clement of Alex., Stromt1teis 1.17, ed.
Otto Stihlin, p. 54. Clement, like Justin before
him and Origen after, is defending free will.
See also St. 4.19 (124); Clem. Alex., P,g. VII
(Stihlin, p.224-14-27); St. 2.16 (74-75).
These and other texts show that the Christian
defense of free will was much more than a simple defense of an earlier idea. In Clement we
see the idea of free will changing from the
earlier Aristotelian notion of free choice to the
voluncaristic notion of God's free creating will
The fathers defend "free choice" (nooalo1cn~),
bur they speak of God "willing" to create man,
"willing" to save man, "willing" to show man
mercy. The Greek idea of free will begins to
a profound transformation at the hands
undergo
of the early Christian theologians. Unfortunately the question is too vast to enter upon
here, but I hope my comments below prepare
the way for a discussion of the larger question.
For the beginning of a discussion of the problem, see Hermann I.angerbeck, A•Jsine s11,
G.osis (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1967) , pp. 156 lf.

II
Free will and belief in rewards and
punishments are central theological ideas
for Origen.16 Free will comes up for discussion frequently in his works and often
receives extended discussion. The more
important passages are: ( 1) the commentary on Gen. 1: 14, "Let there be lights in
the firmament of the heavens to separate
the day from the night, and let them be
for signs and for seasons and for days"
(Philocalia 23); (2) De Princi,piis 3.1 et
passim; (3) De Oratio11e 6.2; (4) Contra
Cels11m 1.66; 2.20; 4.3, 67; 70; 5, 21 et
passim. The commentary on Genesis and
De P,rinci,piis are early works, the De
Oratio,ie was written in the middle of his
life, and Contra Cels11m is one of his last
works. Though the problem of free will
unites each of these works, in every case
Origen places the discussion of free will in
a different context. Thus the discussion in
bis Genesis commentary is almost wholly
a discussion of astrology, whereas in De
Orations, Origen is concerned about the
value of prayer if there is no free will. De
Pnncipiis is almost wholly an exegetical
discussion of a string of passages from the
Old and New Testaments. We begin our
study with De Princip#s.11
Justin's somewhat casual appeal to
Deuteronomy and Isaiah in support of free
will seemed innocent enough. What Justin
10 On free will in Origen, sec Hal Koch,
P,onoi,, tmd. Pt1ide11sis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1932) 1 pp. 276 lf.; Eugene de Faye,
o,;gin11, III (Paris: Bibliotheque de !'Ecole des
Naures :arudes, 1928), 179-98; Amand, pp.
297 ff.
17 Text of De Pnneipiis, eel. P. Koetschau,
GCS, XXII (Berlin: J. C. Hinrich, 1899);
t.mns. G. W. Butterworth, Ongen: 011 Pwsl
Principles (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

(64)
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overlooked, however, was that there are
many more passages in Scripnire which
say quite the reverse, namely that man is
not free and that it is not in his power to
keep the Commandments. It did not take
critics of free will long to discover this,
and Origen was chafing under this criticism. He unrolls a long list of passages in
support of the opposite position, and he
has no little difficulty in showing how they
can be understood in the light of free will.
Origen knew the texts cited by Justin in
support of free will, and he quotes these
as well as several others. TI1ese are but a
handful, however, says Origen, for there
are ''in the Scriptures ten thousand passages which with the utmost clearness
prove the existence of free will." 18 But
there are "certain sayings from both the
Old and the New Testaments [which] incline us to the opposite conclusion," and it
is these that we wish to discuss here, says
Origen. Now this whole section of Ds
Princitpiis is prefaced with the statement
that the "teaching of the church includes
the docuine of the righteous judgment of
God." This, says Origen, "assumes that
[ we] acknowledge that deeds worthy of
praise or of blame lie within our own
power." He then devotes a section of this
work to the subject of "free will, a problem of the utmost urgency." 19 Origen had
made it clear in the preface to the work
that the topic needed attention because of
the belief in asuology, but now he turns
himself almost wholly to exegetical matters. What are we to do with the passages
that seem to oppose belief in free will?
Origen's argument for free will is a

...

18

D• Prine. 3.1.6, 7 (Butterworth, p. 166).
D• Prine. 3.1.1 (Butterworth, p. 157) i
sec also 1. pref. 5 and D• Prine. 3.1.2.
18

38,

blending of the traditional philosophical
arguments set alongside extensive exegesis
of the problematic biblical texts. In much
tbe fashion of Alexander of Aphrodisias
he tries to show that free will applies only
to rational beings, for they alone can "contemplate good and evil and are led to
choose good and avoid evil," and for this
reason we are "worthy of praise when we
devote ourselves to the practice of good
and of blame when we act in the opposite
way." Free will means that one acts not on
the basis of an "external cause" or because
of one's "constitution," but on the basis of
reason.20 The more interesting material
in the chapter, however, is the exegesis.
At fust it appears as though the problem
is relatively simple and can be dismissed
with a few general principles. No matter
what the text seems to say, Origen rules
out any interpretation which suggests that
man is not responsible for his actions. Then
he discusses the story of Pharaoh, of whom
it was said that God "hardens his heart."
If this is so, says Origen, "he [Pharaoh] is
not responsible for the sin, and if this is
so, Pharaoh has no free will." Some take
this text to mean that Paraoh had an
"earthly nature," but this is nonsense, says
Origen. A man with an "earthly nature" is
completely disobedient to God, and does
not need his heart to be hardened. But
this was not so with Pharaoh; it was "possible for him to obey." Further, God is
like a physician who lets his patient "re:!O See Alex. of Aphmd., D• PIiio, 14. Por
the sources of Orlsen's c:listiaaioos
3.1.2 in
( thiogs moved from without, thmp moved
from within, including those "ou~ of ~ selves " that is, livins thiqs. indudins an•mals
and ;.tional beings) see B. Darml Jackson,
"Sources of Origen'• Doctrine of Preedom,"
Ch11reh Hislo,,, XXXV ( 1966) • l, ff.

(65)
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main in the fever and sickness for a long

time in order that he may regain permanent health." Therefore God deals with
men according to His goodness, and sometimes this goodness requires that men be

chastised.21
Ostensibly the subject of this chapter is
free will, but the reader who has come to
Origen with the antifatalistic discussions
in mind cannot but be struck by the shift
in emphasis. The center of gravity here is
not free will at all, but providence, and the
discussion is really concerned to show how
the scriptural picture of God's mercy,
justice, wrath, and grace can be reconciled
with belief in free will. Thus Origen has
little to say about man, but much to say
about God. At the outset the discussion
seeks to show that man is free and responsible and that it is in man's power to put
away wickedness and live a life of virtue.
But after going through the many texts
which atttibute the good that man does to
God, Origen discovers that he cannot
simply assert free will without qualification. He is driven to the more delicate
task of trying to explain how free will and
God's power can exist side by side with
each other. Saipture says over and over
again that "what is built without God ..•
is built in vain," and that it is "not of him
that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God
that has mercy." We must recognize, he
says, that some part of the work had been
done by man but that the happy result was
to be gratefully atuibuted to God who
brought it to pass. In the same way, human
will (lh•lmJJ is not sufficient to enable us
tO attain the end, nor is the running of
those who are athletes sufficient to enable
11

them to gain "the prize of the high calling
of God in Christ Jesus." These things are
accomplished by God's assistance (lheou
It is
gar sy,,q,aristamenou ta11ta
well said that "it is not of him that wills,
nor of him that runs, but of God who has
mercy." Therefore, concludes Origen,
"our perfection does not come to pass
without our doing anything, and yet it is
not completed as a result of our efforts,
but God performs the greater part of it.
... So indeed with our salvation the effects
of God's work are very much in excess of
what we can do." 22

anuela

Origen's conclusion is nothing short of
remarkable in the light of the intellectual
milieu in which he was writing. Let us
briefly reuace his steps. His purpose was
to show that man possessed free will and
that, for this reason, rewards and punishments, praise and blame had meaning. He
wanted to show that the life of virtue, or
of vice for that matter, was in man's
power and that man was not subject to imputable fate, the movement of the stars, or
impersonal necessity. In De Principiu 3.1
he proposed to give an exegetical base for
this claim by refuting the biblical exegesis
of those who rejected free will and by
pointing to those texts in Scripture which
establish free will and human responsibility. En route to this goal, however, he
has to deal with the many texts which
suess the action of God in shaping the life
of man (e.g., Ezek. 11: 19-20; Rom. 9: 16;
Ps.127:1; Phil 3:14; and others), and by
the end of the discussion Origen is moving
in quite a new direction from the one in
which he began. Origen assumes, and
sometimes employs, the moral argument

D. Pri,,&. 3.1.8, 13 (Butterworth, pp.169,

181).

22

D•

Prme. 3.1.19 (Buaeiwortb, p.197).
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forged by Carneades, and he agrees with
its basic contention, yet the old Greek
arguments take on a new shade as they
are injected into the Christian context.
For the Greeks there seemed to be no
middle ground or compromise between
fate and free will, and with this Origen
agrees, at least in theory. But the Christian
tradition, though rejecting belief in fate,
nevertheless confessed a God who appeared
quite as capricious as the gods of the
astrologers. The prophets and apostles repeat over and over again: "I, the Lord,
choose you . . . have formed you in your
mother's womb ... have made you what
you are." "I take away the stony hearts of
men and put in them hearts of Besh that
they may walk in my judgments." To the
outsider, and to many insiders as well, the
Christian God appeared as only the latest
expression of the age-old belief in fate and
destiny.
Origen is saddled, then, with a problem
quite new to Greek thought. He realizes
the necessity of supporting free will and its
corollary of "rewards and punishments,"
but he also must give a place to the biblical
account of a uanscendent, free, creating,
lcving God. The conflict is a real one for
Origen, and he will have to return to it in
the last years of his life when he writes
against Celsus. The Greeks saw no real
conflict between God's power and man's
will. 'The schism which we feel between
the divine influence and human decision
did not 'exist' for the Greek," writes Max
Pohlenz.28 One or two Greek writers had
an inkling of the difficulties, but they were
able to dismiss the matter quickly. For example, in his Conolllntu Pluw:ch won-

dered about the Homeric statements that
gods and goddesses prompted or inspired
action. In the Iliad Achilles aies, "Goddess, it is necessary that I obey the word
of you two, angry though I am in my
heart." This suggests to some, says Plutarch, that it is impossible to believe in
"choice" (,p,oairesis). But this does not
follow. Some acts require "inspiration and
desperate courage." God does not talce
away choice but "prompts man's choice,
setting his will in motion." 2' The gods
sometimes incite us to action or engender
conceptions and ideas, but they do not
move our hands and feet or compel our
decision.
The comparison with Origen is suiking, if for no other reason than that the
Homeric gods are so unlike the God envisioned by the texts in this chapter of
De Princi,piis. Consequently Origen's attempt to defend free will and to establish
the Christian belief in rewards and punishments leads him to a consideration of
God's power and grace in the turning of
man from evil to good. The c.ondusion to
this chapter is that man's will is free, that
men are not different because of diverse
natures, but that man is what he is by virtue of his will working in conjunction with
God's power. ''The power of God does
not by itself fashion a man for honor or
for dishonor, but God finds a ground of
difference in our will as it inclines to the
better or to the worse." 211
This conclusion must be viewed in light
of the earlier discussion. Taken at face
value it seems trite and innocuous at best,
and at worse a blatant synergism, to use the
H

28

Pohlenz, Pr•Mlom, p. 125.

387

3.1.24

21

llillll 1.216; Plucarch, Cono""',u
32.
D• p,.;,,,.
(Buaerworth, p. 208).
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Reformation term, demonstrating the decadence of the second and third centuries.
But seen in context it is remarkable, for it
is hardly the kind of thing to say to an
opponent who was a fatalist. Origen
could have made it much easier for himself
if he bad stuck with the traditional Greek
arguments against fatalism and for freedom of the will. They were tough to answer and the kinks and loopholes had
long been elimioatf!d.
In fact, this is precisely the argument
that he chooses in the Commenta,, on
Genesis. Here the topic is explicitly astrological fatalism which was suggested by
Gen. 1: 14 and the references to the stars,
and the opponents are practicers of divination within and without the Christian community. Astrology destroys "free will," says
Odgen, and it makes "praise and blame unmeaning," for it undercuts the "distinction
between acceptable conduct and conduct
deserving of blame." 28 The bulk of the
discussion, however, is relatively "untheological" and turns on the philosophical
28 Philoulil, 23.1 (ed. J. Armicage Robinson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1893), trans. George lewis, Th• Philouli11 of
Orign [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911)),
pp. l73-74; also Phil. 23.3 (Lewis, P• 176);
23.8 (Lewis, p.181); Phil. 23.14-18. For a
summary of many arguments against astrology
in the 1CCODd century see Aulus Gellius' synopsis
of Pavorinus' antiastrological discourse in Gellius, Noa;,,,. .Ui&1m1m 14.1; summary in
Amaod, p. 98, n. 2; Cramer, pp. 197-98. Here
are two examples of arguments similar to those
used by Origeo. 'The constellation prevailing
at conception is necessarily different from the
one at birth. Which of the £WO is the decisive
one, or must
both be reconciled?"
''Not even U!Chnically can usually the exact
moment of birth be established. The smallest
~reoce in time produces a different constellaaoo. Thus even U!Chnically it is impossible
ID obtain an arouate birth horoscope."

criticism of astrology sprinkled with illusuations from the Christian Bible.

III
In the Contra Cels,em the scene has
changed again.27 The old debate over the
scriptural exegesis in De Princi,piis seems
forgotten, as well as the question of
prayer.28 The influence of the stars on human behavior is mentioned several times
and discussed once, but it does not hold
the center of attention. Nevertheless the
phrase "rewards and punishments" occurs
more frequently in this work than in any
other and seems at times to bear the main
weight of the argument. In this last section I would like to show how the problem
raised in De Pri,zci,piis 3.1, that is, the tension between divine power and man's free
27 The question of astrology docs come up
in Con. Cels. 2.20-21, and the argument here
is similar to that in the CommBnlllr, on Gm•siJ.
The debate centers in part about foreknowledge.
Interestingly this section of Con. C•ls. is inserted in the Philoc11lu, in the middle of the
section from the Commn111,, on Gtm•sis (Phil.
23.12-U). Origen here relies on traditional
arguments and illustrations against foreknowledge. For example, he cites Euripides, Phomu111• 18-20, a stock example, also cited by Alex.
of Aphrod., On Pt1IB, 31. See Henry Chadwick,
"Origen, Celsus and the Stoa," Jo•r,ud, of Th•ologiul St11dias, XLVIII ( 1947), 46, n. 2.
28

The work on prayer conuibures little new

to the discussion, except to indicate how fate

and astrology caused problems for popular piety,
for Christians as well as others. Here are two
objections against prayer, says Origen. "Pint,
if God knows the future beforehand, and it
must come to pass, prayer is vain. Secondly,
if all mings happen according to the will of
God, and if what is willed by him is fixed, and
nothing of what he wills can be chansed, prayer
is vain" (DB 0,111. 5.6; trans. Henry Chadwick,
Lib,11r, of Christin C£usics II [Philadelphia:
Fortress. 1954]), 250. For the attitude of
Romans, see citation from Valens Vettius re£erred to in fn. 9.

somehow
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will, reemerges and leads Origen to reBect
on a series of issues apparently unrelated
to free will and rewards, but in fact intimately part of the same scheme of
thought.
Celsus had accused the Christians of being innovators.29 They had spurned the
ancient doctrines embraced by civilized
peoples to urge new and strange teachings
which did not have the sanction of antiquity. According to Celsus this ancient
doctrine taught that the order of the world
was fixed and established and that nothing
could interfere with the regular course of
nature without upsetting the balance. "For
if you changed any one quite insignificant
thing on earth you would upset and destroy
everything," writes Celsus ( Con. Cels. 4.5).
The regular recurrence of nature gives continuity to human experience and meaning
to life, for "according to the determined
cycles the same things always have happened, are now happening, and will happen." The "period of mortal life is similar
from beginning to end." Celsus ( 4.67)
reasoned that if this were not so, then one
would have to atuibute change and alteration to the interference of a divine power;
eventually this would lead to the conclusion
that God was the author of evil.
Origen sarcastically replies that if this
ir so, then we will have to endure Celsus
writing his book, Th• Tf'llt1 W'Mll, every
time the wheel of man's fortune makes its
cycle. It is "inevitable that Socrates will always be a philosopher and be accused of
inuoducing new deities and of corrupting
the youth. . • • Moses will always come
out of Egypt with the people of the
Co,,. C•ls. 1.14; 5.25; see Carl Andresen,
No""'s (Berlin: Walter de GruJter,
1955), pp. 189 ff.
20

UJ60S llflll

389

Jews; Jesus will come to visit this life ....
The same people will be Christians, and
Celsus will write this book again, though
he has written it before an infinite number
of times." If Celsus is correct, asks Origen,
"how can free will be preserved and praise
and blame be reasonable?" ( 4.67). Origen
urges the same argument against Celsus
that he offered against the asuologers,
Gnostics, and others. He seems to reduce
every problem to the same issue. Is this a
lack of imagination and resourcefulness on
the part of Odgen, or is he really speaking
to the point?
The unspoken issue underlying the debate with asuologers and fatalists in antiquity is, of course, freedom. In Greek
thinking, freedom at one time had highly
political overtones; it designated the ideal
of political freedom of a city or state and
had the power to incite and move men to
action. But during the Hellenistic period
freedom lost many of these connotations
and underwent a gradual process of internalizing. Inner freedom of the individual
became the goal for which men suove.80
The debate over asuology and fate can be
read as a suuggle to win this kind of individual freedom for men. In this context
free will becomes the center of attention,
for only if man has the possibility of choice
can he be free. But freedom of choice demands the possibility of doing something
new, of breaking the inevitable causal chain
of action. And newness or innovation requires change and alteration. It is preao Pohleaz wrices: ''Political freedom, for
which men had once been enthusiastic, was
gone beyond recall; what DO!' ~ ics place
was the imier freedom of the mdiv1dual, • pos.
session not of the philo,ophical schools alone,
but of the whole educaced world."" (Prntlo,,.,

p.144)
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cisely at this point that Origen joins the
issue with Celsus. We say, writes Odgen,
that "certain things change" and that there
is a "new reformation" by which "God •••
makes good that which is wrong." He corrects men in a "world of alteration and
change." It is in the "nature of our free
will to admit various possibilities" ( 4.69;
521; 4.4). For Origen free will is really
a symbol of openness to the future and to
new poaibilities, to use the modern phrase.
It is freedom from the past.

Change and new possibilities for Origen
have reference primarily to the sphere of
moral behavior. He does not have in mind
a change of beliefs or opinions, but rather
the change which comes about through
moral betterment, improvement, and reforming of one's life. For this reason the
chief evidence that Origen brings to support his view of free will- and here is
where he pans company with his nonChristian contemporaries-is the empirial faa that with the coming of Christianity more men had been changed from
evil to good than through any other philosophial school I say "empirical" because
Origen is not theologizing about what
"should" be the case with Christianity, but
what has in faa taken place. There is
evidence of the work of Jesus, he writes,
for "in the churches of God there are
people converted through Jesus from
countless evils" ( 1.67). Christianity offen itself to men as do other philosophical
schools and asks that it be judged on its
aa:omplishments. "Philosophy should be
approved on the ground that its doctrines
in those who persuaded them had the
power to change men from such evils although •'-- had previously been grip~

dreams, since the testimony of Galen OD
the Christians supports him, as well as the
statements of other observers. Alexander
of Lycopolis wrote: "The great multitude
listen to them [the Christians] - as one
can learn from experience - and increases
in virtuousness and piety are stamped OD
their charaaers, giving rise to the type
of morality which this way of life engenders and leading them gradually towards
the desire for the noble." 81
The conclusion to Origen's argument is
that without belief in free will and rewards
and punishments, change from evil to
good, betterment, improvement could
hardly occur. Therefore Origen claims that
many uneducated and simple people have
been "made better . . • by the belief that
they are punished for sin and rewarded
for good works" ( 1.9). What Origen
has done is to bind rogether the experience of Christianity as a force for moral
betterment with the uaditional ideas of
free will and rewards and punishments in
the Greco-Roman world. Christians believe in rewards and punishments because
they believe that men are capable of changing from good and evil and that they are
not destined to remain what they are by
birth.
Origen, however, is quite aware that he
has not done justice to the Christian claims
by simply upholding belief in free will and
rewards and punishments. If his argument
thus far has been granted, namely, that the
81

For Galen, see Richard Walzer, G,Jn, n
],nus tmtl Christilms (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 57 ff. In some matten
·they live in a way befitting "genuine pbilosopbers" (tdi1h81 t,hilosopholffll•sJ. Cication of
Alen.oder, Com,11 M11nieh. tlist,""'1io, ed. Aususms Brinkmann (Leipzig: B. G. Greubner,
1895), p. 3, 1-18; trans. Walzer, p. 72.

-,
~
by them" (1.64). Origen is not dreaming
(70)
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coming of Christianity brought genuine
change and moral betterment, and that this
could only be possible if men possessed
free will, then the question arises: What
is it about Christianity that gave men the
power to make such radical change? Free
will is a possession of all men, not only
Christians. At this point Origen returns
to the questions raised in De P,-i,1cipiis.
Genuine change from evil to good is possible only by the power of God. We submit, he writes, that any teaching which is
"able to deliver souls from the .flood of
evil and from licentiousness and wrongdoing and from despising God, and were
to give as a proof of this work one hundred
reformed characters (supposing this to be
the number for the pwposes of argument),
could one reasonably say that it was without divine help that this man had implanted in the hundred men a docuine
capable of delivering them from evils of
such magnitude?" ( 1.26). It was not until
the coming of Jesus that the power of God
was present in such an extraordinary way
and that the dramatic improvement of
mankind began. Jesus did things "beyond
the power of human nature" ( 1.27), and
even to this day "the power of Jesus brings
about conversion and moral reformation
in those who believe in God through him
( 1.43) . Such transformation of men does
not happen unless some power is also given
by God, for other teachings similar to ours
have not had the "same power to win over
souls." ( 6.2)
Now Celsus had seen dearly that Christianity did make such a claim about God's
power. He also recognized that the Christian belief required that there be interference and interruption in the course of history and the order of the world. Therefme
11

he attacked the Christians for the absurd
belief that there had been a "descent on
the part of God" disrupting the course of
history. Why could not the deity have
simply changed men by "divine power"
without sending "someone especially endowed for this purpose"? ( 4.3). Origen
finds himself again in the same dilemma:
God's power and providence are in tension
with man's free will. Therefore he replies
that if God had simply changed men by
"divine power," this would have desuoyed
free will. For if you "take away the element of free will from virtue, you also
desuoy its essence" ( 1.4). Therefore God
was present in Jesus and through Him
God's power brought the re-formation of
mankind for He came as the "re-former of
the whole world" (1.8). "If one may say
that certain things change by the presence
of God's power and the advent of the
Word to man, we will not hesitate to affirm that anyone who has received the coming of the Word of God into his own soul
changes from bad to good, from licentiousness to self-conuol, and from superstition
to piety." ( 1.5)

Concl11sion

In the end Origen's defense of free will
and rewards and punishments led him to
the conclusion that genuine moral re-formation could only come about by divine
power antl man's will. But the claim that
through the power of God in Jesus men
were re-formed exposed Origen to precisely
the charge he and other apologists sought
to avoid, namely, that man is a plaything
in the hand of God. The Christian view
of grace and election appeared as another
form of fatalism and determinism. Christians simply .replaced one bondage by an-
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other; man's freedom, now that he was released from the stranglehold of fate, was
subject to the whims of the God of the
Jewish Saiptures. So Origen winds up
treading a very narrow path. Against fate
and astrology he asserted free will and rewards and punishments; in response to the
biblical picture of a saving, redeeming God
he imerts that only through God can man
really change. Origen wants to have it
both ways: free will and God's power and
grace. For if Christians taught only free
will, how would they dilfer from other
Hellenistic thinkers? But if they completely submerged man's will to God's
power, how were they different from the
fatalists and astrologers?
To the Roman world, Origen's point of
view was conttadiaory, embracing belief
in providence, while at the same time rejecting fate. The Stoics had accepted providence, but they also denied fate. The chief
opponent of fatalism, Cameades, had
denied providence for the very purpose of
rejecting fate and upholding free will.
Now the Christians come along and support Carneades, who rejects fate, but reject Cameades, who rejects providence.
The Oiristian appeal to rewards and
punishments was set against the goddess
Fate, but it was adapted to embrace the
God of grace. What may have appeared
to later Christian thinkers as a gospel of

works was in the Greco-Roman world a
gospel of freedom. For if men's wills were
not free, God's goodness and grace and
power made no sense.
Origen took the unprecedented step of
embracing both horns of the dilemma.
In doing so he put his finger on a great
and troubling problem. He touched a sensitive nerve close to the center of the
Christian experience. How does one give
full place to the initiative of God's grace
in man's salvation without making man
an automaton? Justin Martyr, himself
a thinker of some ability, did not realize
what was at stake when he blithely set forth
free will as Christian teaching. Oblivious
to the dilemma he helped forge for Christian thought, Justin repeated arguments
conceived and shaped in a wholly different
intellectual and religious milieu. Origen,
a more original mind and, more important,
a more accomplished exegete, sensed the
magnitude of the problem. It is not to
his discredit that he was unsuccessful in
solving it. Consider the others in the history of Christian thought who tried. Augustine and Pelagius, Duns ScotuS and
Thomas, Luther and Erasmus, the Synod
of Dort and the Westminster Assembly.
What Origen posed as a new problem was
to captivate the most creative Christian
minds for centuries.
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